The Amazon suffers from the occurrence of mining along its hydrographic routes, which releases toxic substances into the aquatic environment. The objective of this study was to evaluate the risk of contamination by As and Hg that indigenous peoples are exposed to through the consumption of fish in an area impacted by mining activity in the basin of the Curuá and Baú Rivers, Altamira-PA. In total, 55 fish specimens and 30 surface water samples were collected. The decomposition of the fish samples was done by wet method with the use of nitric acid, hydrogen peroxide, and microwaves. The quantification of total mercury (THg) and total arsenic (TAs) was carried out by inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectrometry with vapor generation (VG-ICP OES). The methodology proposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was used. The results showed that TAs presents safe levels; however, THg presents a sample with levels up to (4.6 µg g 1), exceeding the permitted levels (1 µg g 1). The risk assessment shows that only the consumption of fish, linked to Hg, represents the existence of deleterious risks to indigenous peoples (hazard quotient (HQ)) > 1). Bioaccumulation factor (BAF) in fish represents a risk to indigenous people, because of the Hg’s presence. The study identified that illegal mining activities are responsible for Hg pollution in the Baú and Curuá Rivers. The fish species analyzed can be used as bioindicators of Hg in the rivers, which is relevant for making environmental and public health policy decisions.

This article analyzes aspects of two ubiquitous phenomena in contemporary societies: migration and violations of rights to physical integrity. It focuses on violations of rights to physical integrity, such as torture and political assassination, that take place in the countries that migrants leave behind (home countries). This paper explores the association between migration and violent political repression via one observable aspect of migration: transfers of sums of money from migrants to individuals in their home countries. These transfers are called remittances. This article engages with the growing literature on remittances to ask whether remittances influence the protection of rights to physical integrity within migrant-sending countries. An analysis of 21 Latin American countries between 1981 and 2014 shows that remittances are associated with less protection of rights to physical integrity. Our empirical analysis reveals this unintended effect of remittances, which is mediated by political protests and elections. A case study of Haiti illustrates the association between peaks of remittances and repression.

O presente artigo trata das consequências das sanções para a proteção dos direitos humanos na América Latina. A literatura sobre sanções econômicas e sobre cumprimento orienta três hipóteses, que investigam a relação entre sanções econômicas e o nível de proteção aos direitos humanos em dois grupos de países: aqueles que foram objeto de sanções e aqueles que não sofreram sanções. Com base em dados da Political Terror Scale (Escala de Terror Político) e da Freedom House, encontra-se evidência empírica de que sanções melhoram o nível de proteção em países que não foram objeto dessa forma de pressão econômica. Esse resultado pode ser explicado pelo efeito inibidor atribuído às sanções econômicas pela literatura sobre cumprimento. A presença de uma sanção em um dado ano aumenta a probabilidade de se observar melhores práticas de direitos humanos em quase 50%. Esse resultado vale para todos os 12 países latino-americanos que não foram objeto de sanção no período de 1976-2004.

This article addresses the consequences of economic sanctions for the protection of human rights in Latin America. The literature on sanctions and compliance informs three hypotheses, which investigate the relationship between sanctions and the level of rights protection in two groups of countries: those that were targeted by sanctions and those that were not. Using data from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) and from Freedom House, I find empirical evidence that sanctions do improve the level of protection in countries that were not targeted. This finding can be explained by the deterrent effect attributed to sanctions by the compliance literature, broadly interpreted. The presence of economic sanctions in a given year increases the probability of observing better human rights practices by almost 50%. These results hold for the 12 Latin American countries that were not subject to economic sanctions for the period 1976-2004.

Por que disputas comerciais no âmbito da Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC) são decididas predominantemente de forma amigável, não obstante a existência de um sofisticado mecanismo quasi-adjudicatório para a resolução dessas controvérsias? Como explicar a preferência da parte que inicia uma disputa pela solução amigável, quando se sabe que a OMC, em média, decide 64% dos casos a favor do iniciante? Este artigo analisa padrões de solução de controvérsias no sistema do Acordo Geral de Tarifas e Comércio e da Organização Mundial de Comércio (GATT/OMC), por meio da teoria dos movimentos (BRAMS, 1994), com o propósito de estudar as escolhas estratégicas disponíveis para as partes. Propõe-se que, no sistema do GATT/OMC, as partes em uma disputa comercial agem de forma magnânima quando abrem mão do melhor resultado em um jogo. Esta ação é racional porque ela oferece à parte demandada maiores chances de se alcançar uma solução amigável da disputa. Esse comportamento não encontra explicação satisfatória no conceito de equilíbrio míope da teoria dos jogos tradicional. Em contrapartida, a teoria dos movimentos incorpora a noção de equilíbrio não-míope ao seu modelo de tomada de decisões. Este artigo explica o comportamento não-míope e racional dos jogadores quando estes buscam o segundo melhor resultado no jogo. Três disputas comerciais ilustram a análise e caracterizam situações em que: (i) a solução amigável advém do comportamento magnânimo; (ii) a solução amigável ocorre a despeito do comportamento magnânimo; e (iii) não há solução amigável.

Why most trade disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO) end in a friendly settlement, despite the existence of a sophisticated dispute settlement mechanism? How can we explain the complainant's preference for a friendly settlement when we know that the WTO decides 64% of the cases in favor of the complainant? In this article I discuss patterns of settlement in the GATT/WTO system using theory of moves (BRAMS, 1994) to study the strategic choices available to disputants. I suggest that in the WTO system complainants act magnanimously, thereby bypassing their best outcome in a game. This is rational on their part because it offers defendants more opportunity to settle, which is beneficial to both sides. This behavior is not well explained by the myopic equilibrium concepts of standard game theory. By contrast, theory of moves incorporates non-myopic reasoning into its model of decision-making. In particular, I explain why it is rational for players to act non-myopically on occasion and move to their second-best outcome in a game. Three case studies illustrate the analysis (i) when settlement follows magnanimity, (ii) when settlement occurs regardless of magnanimity, and (iii) when there is no settlement. These three outcomes exhaust the empirical record of WTO disputes.